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MISSOURI’S UNEMPLOYMENT CRISIS: THE LABOR AND 
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION IGNORES THE 
MISSOURI SUPREME COURT 
INTRODUCTION 
Unemployment insurance has long been part of the American social and 
economic structure.  It has been called by many names and has been given a 
myriad of definitions.  Socially, it has been defined as a “safety net” for those 
who have been employed for a long period of time but who find themselves 
without a job for reasons beyond their control.1  Unemployment insurance 
arguably allows these individuals to avoid impoverishment while searching for 
other meaningful employment.2  Economically, unemployment insurance has 
been held out as an economic stabilizer which assures “that there is no 
permanent underclass of needy made up of the temporarily unemployed.”3  
However, a corporation, small business owner, or conservative economist may 
feel that unemployment insurance is just a form of social welfare, “doled out to 
those unable to hold a job, and thus an unfair burden on commerce and 
business owners.”4  Today, with the economic recession affecting small and 
big business alike, and with unemployment figures soaring over ten percent, 
the importance of deciding who does and who does not receive unemployment 
benefits has never had greater implications.5 
Historically, unemployment insurance was created by the Social Security 
Act of 19356 due to the large number of unemployed persons during the Great 
Depression.7  The Act established a system of state and federal unemployment 
insurance laws.8  Under the Act, each state establishes its own eligibility 
requirements and regulations via statute and bureaucratic systems, with some 
 
 1. L’Nayim A. Shuman-Austin, Comment, Is Leaving Work to Obtain Safety “Good 
Cause” to Leave Employment?—Providing Unemployment Insurance to Victims of Domestic 
Violence in Washington State, 23 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 797, 798–99 (2000) (citing 1 THE PUBLIC 
ROOSEVELT PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 445–73 (1938)). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. at 798. 
 4. Id. 
 5. See Peter S. Goodman, Economists Scan Jobs Data, Seeking Signs of Hope, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 7, 2009, at B1. 
 6. Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620 (1935) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 7. Shuman-Austin, supra note 1, at 807. 
 8. Social Security Act of 1935, preamble, 49 Stat. at 620. 
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minimal guidelines provided by the federal government.9  These state statutes 
and bureaucratic regulations are open to interpretation by state courts.10  So, 
state judiciaries play a large role in shaping policies and rules regarding access 
to unemployment insurance benefits.11 
In Missouri, eligibility for unemployment insurance is governed by Section 
288 of the Missouri Revised Statutes12 and the rules and regulations 
promulgated by the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission, Division of 
Employment Security.13  However, Missouri courts have had a dramatic 
impact on unemployment insurance in Missouri, particularly regarding the 
determination of what qualifies as voluntarily leaving one’s employment.14  
Generally, Missouri courts held that if an individual left his job “voluntarily,” 
that individual was disqualified from receiving benefits unless there was a 
“causal connection” between the individual leaving and his job.15  In Difatta-
Wheaton v. Dolphin Capital Corp., the Missouri Supreme Court fundamentally 
changed Missouri’s policy regarding how a non-work-related illness affects 
whether a separation from employment is considered voluntary.16  The court 
correctly expanded access to unemployment insurance for individuals with 
various illnesses not related to their work.17  However, the Missouri Labor and 
 
 9. See 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(5) (2006) (preventing states from denying benefits to an eligible 
claimant under certain circumstances). 
 10. See MO. REV. STAT. § 288.020(2) (2005 & Supp. 2010) (“This law shall be liberally 
construed to accomplish its purpose to promote employment security both by increasing 
opportunities for jobs through the maintenance of a system of public employment offices and by 
providing for the payment of compensation to individuals in respect to their unemployment.”). 
 11. See, e.g., Campbell v. Labor & Indus. Relations Comm’n, 907 S.W.2d 246, 249 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1995) (“The general purpose of the Act is to provide unemployment compensation benefits 
to those who are unemployed through no fault of their own. . . .  Courts should liberally construe 
the law to meet that goal.”) (citing MO. REV. STAT. § 288.020 (1994); O’Dell v. Div. Emp’t Sec., 
376 S.W.2d 137, 141 (Mo. 1964)). 
 12. See generally MO. REV. STAT. § 288 (2005 & Supp. 2007). 
 13. MO. REV. STAT. § 288.220(5) (2005); see also About the Division of Employment 
Security, MO. DEP’T OF LAB. & INDUS. RELATIONS, http://www.labor.mo.gov/DES/about.asp 
(last visited July 31, 2011). 
 14. See Difatta-Wheaton v. Dolphin Capital Corp., 271 S.W.3d 594, 596–97 (Mo. 2008) (en 
banc) (demonstrating that Missouri courts have altered and changed the criteria for voluntarily 
leaving employment due to an illness). 
 15. See, e.g., id. at 597 (citing Duffy v. Labor & Indus. Relations Comm’n, 556 S.W.2d 195, 
198 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977)). 
 16. See id. at 598. 
 17. See id. at 599 (holding that an employee did not leave work voluntarily and, therefore, 
should not be denied unemployment benefits, despite the fact that her illness was non-work-
related). 
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Industrial Relations Commission has wrongly refused to recognize the policy 
shift Difatta-Wheaton represents.18 
In Part I, this Comment will discuss the labyrinth an employee must find 
their way through when attempting to obtain unemployment insurance 
benefits.  Part II will discuss Missouri’s unemployment insurance law prior to 
Difatta-Wheaton.  Specifically, Part II will lay out how Missouri courts and the 
Labor and Industrial Relations Commission determined if an individual had 
left work voluntarily when a non-work-related illness was the cause of their 
departure.  Part III of the comment will focus on the Missouri Supreme Court’s 
analysis in Difatta-Wheaton and demonstrate how the policy in Difatta-
Wheaton has been widely accepted by Missouri courts.  Moreover, Part III will 
show how the analysis in Difatta-Wheaton was intended to expand access to 
unemployment insurance benefits to those who left work because of an illness, 
even if the illness was not caused, or made worse by, their jobs.  Part IV will 
demonstrate that the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission has failed to 
recognize the policy change Difatta-Wheaton and subsequent cases have 
created.  Moreover, the Comment will conclude by showing that the Labor and 
Industrial Relations Commission’s decision to ignore Difatta-Wheaton has 
caused an unemployment crisis in Missouri. 
I.  NAVIGATING THE LABYRINTH—GAINING ACCESS TO UNEMPLOYMENT 
BENEFITS IN MISSOURI 
To understand the crises the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission’s 
decision to ignore Difatta-Wheaton has created,19 one must first understand the 
time-consuming labyrinth that an unemployed individual must navigate 
through when attempting to get benefits.  This confusing process is 
compounded when the law is applied incorrectly at different levels of the 
Commission, as a wrongful denial of benefits forces the claimant to go through 
a confusing appellate process within the Commission itself.20  Moreover, if the 
Commission ultimately denies the claimant benefits wrongfully and incorrectly 
applies the law, the claimant can only appeal to the appropriate appellate court, 
initiating another confusing and lengthy process.21  The confusion for 
 
 18. See infra notes 276–92 and accompanying text; see also Selected Case Law Passages, 
MO. DEP’T OF LAB. & INDUS. RELATIONS, http://www.labor.mo.gov/DES/Appeals/selected_ 
caselaw.asp (last visited June 20, 2011) (characterizing Difatta-Wheaton as a misconduct case). 
 19. See, e.g., Johnson v. Div. of Emp’t Sec., 318 S.W.3d 797, 802–03 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010) 
(discussing the Commission’s decision to interpret the Difatta-Wheaton holding as a unique 
exception to quitting voluntarily because the claimant had a life-threatening illness). 
 20. See infra notes 28–49 and accompanying text (describing the procedure a claimant must 
follow in order to appeal a denial of unemployment benefits within the Commission). 
 21. See infra notes 50–68 and accompanying text (describing the procedure that must be 
followed when a claimant appeals the Commission’s decision to the Missouri Court of Appeals). 
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claimants is only further exacerbated when they must proceed pro se, which a 
large portion are forced to do.22 
A. The Filing and Appeals Process at the Administrative Level 
In Missouri, to receive unemployment insurance benefits, an employee 
must file a claim with the Missouri Division of Employment Security.23  The 
claim process begins when a claimant calls the Division center, or logs onto 
the Division’s website, and files the “initial claim.”24 
After the claim is filed, the claimant’s employer is given an opportunity to 
file a response to the claim for unemployment benefits.25  The claim is then 
assigned to a “Deputy,” who decides if the employee qualifies for benefits.26  
The Deputy is required to issue a written statement stating the factual and legal 
reasons the employee was either granted or denied benefits.27  Unless the 
claimant or the employer files an appeal from the Deputy’s determination 
within thirty days, the determination becomes final.28  If an appeal is filed, the 
claim is sent to the “Appeals Tribunal.”29 
The Missouri Division of Employment Security’s Appeals Tribunal 
consists of a “referee” or a body consisting of three referees.30  The tribunal 
conducts a hearing, in which it may collect additional evidence and must issue 
its own independent decision.31  These hearings have their own rules regarding 
order of proof, burden of proof, evidence, and objections.32  Based on the 
evidence admitted at the hearing, which can include testimony by the 
employee and employer, the tribunal makes a record and determines whether 
or not the claimant will receive benefits.33  The decision of the tribunal is 
required to set forth findings of fact, state the applicable provisions of the law, 
 
 22. Claimants who must appeal to an appellate court without a lawyer often have their cases 
dismissed.  See, e.g., Tavacoli v. Div. of Emp’t Sec., 261 S.W.3d 708, 710 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008); 
Rainey v. Express Med. Transporters, Inc., 254 S.W.3d 905, 906, 908 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008). 
 23. See MO. REV. STAT. § 288.030.1(20) (Supp. 2011); MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 8, § 10-
3.010(1) (Supp. 2011); 1 MO. EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE LAW § 4.5 (MoBarCLE, 3d ed. 2008) 
[hereinafter MO. EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE LAW]. 
 24. MO. REV. STAT. § 288.030.1(20); MO. CODE REGS. ANN. § 10-3.010(1); MO. 
EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE LAW, supra note 23, § 4.5. 
 25. MO. REV. STAT. § 288.070.1. 
 26. Id. § 288.070.4. 
 27. Id. § 288.070.5. 
 28. Id. § 288.070.6.  The thirty-day period may be expanded for good cause.  Id. § 
288.070.10. 
 29. Id. § 288.190; see also MO. EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE LAW, supra note 23, § 4.12. 
 30. MO. REV. STAT. §§ 288.030(1), 288.190.1. 
 31. Id. § 288.190.1; MO. EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE LAW, supra note 23, § 4.26. 
 32. See MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 8, § 10-5.015 (Supp. 2011); MO. EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE 
LAW, supra note 23, §§ 4.21–4.24. 
 33. MO. REV. STAT. § 288.190.2–3. 
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and state the tribunal’s ultimate holding.34  The tribunal may “affirm, modify, 
or reverse the determination of the deputy, or shall remand the matter to the 
deputy with directions.”35  However, the decision becomes final thirty days 
after the date of the decision, if the claimant or the employer fails to file a 
motion for reconsideration.36  Moreover, if there is no filing within the thirty 
days, the parties lose all rights to appeal.37 
If the claimant or employer is not satisfied with the Tribunal’s decision, 
they can appeal, via a motion for reconsideration or application for review, to 
the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission.38  The Commission may deny 
the motion or application for review, and it is not required to issue a written 
decision as to why.39  In this instance, the decision of the Appeals Tribunal is 
treated as the decision of the Commission itself.40 
If the Commission grants the motion or application, the Commission then 
decides whether or not it wants to take new evidence on the matter or hold oral 
arguments.41  If the Commission decides it needs more evidence to make a 
determination, it may remand the matter to the Appeals Tribunal for an 
additional hearing.42  If oral argument is requested within ten days of the 
application for review the Commission may grant the request.43  If oral 
argument is granted, however, the parties are required to file a brief before the 
date of the oral argument, and new evidence and facts are generally not 
allowed to be presented.44 
In most cases, the Commission restricts itself to a review of the record 
made at the Appeals Tribunal’s hearing without holding an additional hearing 
or oral argument.45  The Commission is allowed to simply adopt the findings 
of fact made by the Appeals Tribunal.46  The Commission, however, may also 
make its own findings of fact and conclusions of law based on the whole 
record because the Commission is not bound by any of the Tribunal’s 
findings.47  That is, the Commission is not bound by the Tribunal’s credibility, 
 
 34. MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 8, § 10-5.050(2) (Supp. 2011). 
 35. MO. REV. STAT. § 288.190.3. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. MO. REV. STAT. § 288.200.1 (2005). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id.; MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 8, § 20-4.010 (Supp. 2011). 
 42.  MO. REV. STAT. § 288.200.1. 
 43.  MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 8, § 20-4.010(4) (Supp. 2011). 
 44. Id. § 20-40.010(4)–(5). 
 45. MO. EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE LAW, supra note 23, § 4.53. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1474 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 55:1469 
evidentiary, or legal determinations.48  The Commission is required to make 
“unequivocal, affirmative findings of the facts” when coming to an ultimate 
conclusion, which it can do by simply adopting the holding of the Appeals 
Tribunal.49  If a claimant or employer is unsatisfied with the Commission’s 
ultimate decision, then the claimant or the employer can seek review of the 
decision in the courts.50 
B. Getting the Courts Involved 
Jurisdiction to review a decision of the Commission lies with the 
appropriate appellate court.51  The claimant, however, has only twenty days 
from the date of the Commission’s final decision until an appeal must be 
filed.52  In order to initiate an appeal, the claimant must file two copies of Form 
No. 8-B with the secretary of the Commission and pay the appropriate docket 
fee.53  If the claimant is the party appealing, he or she is exempt from paying 
the docket fee.54  The claimant, however, is not exempt from the requirements 
to serve a copy of the notice of appeal on the attorneys of all parties 
represented and to serve appropriate notice on all parties not represented.55 
The appellate court reviews the record created at the Commission level, 
and there is no opportunity for the parties to present additional evidence or 
facts.56  Moreover, the findings of fact of the Commission are conclusive if 
they are supported by substantial evidence and are not fraudulent.57  The 
appellate court, however, is not bound by the conclusions of law made by the 
Commission.58  Thus, the jurisdiction of the court is confined solely to 
questions of law.59  The appellate court can “modify, reverse, remand for 
rehearing, or set aside the decision” on the grounds that “the Commission acted 
without or in excess of its powers . . . the decision was procured by fraud . . . 
the facts found by the Commission do not support the award . . . [or] there was 
 
 48. Id. (citing Husky Corp. v. Labor & Indus. Relations Comm’n, 628 S.W.2d 378, 379 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 1982) (holding that the Commission is the trier of fact with the right to determine the 
credibility of witnesses)). 
 49. McClellan v. Brown Transfer & Storage Co., 950 S.W.2d 704, 707 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997). 
 50. MO. REV. STAT. § 288.210 (2005). 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. MO. EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE LAW, supra note 23, § 4.56. 
 54. MO. REV. STAT. § 288.380.5 (Supp. 2011). 
 55. MO. EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE LAW, supra note 23, § 4.56. 
 56. MO. REV. STAT. § 288.210 (2005) (“Upon appeal no additional evidence shall be 
heard.”); MO. EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE LAW, supra note 23, § 4.57. 
 57. MO. REV. STAT. § 288.210. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
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no sufficient competent evidence in the record to warrant the making of the 
award.”60 
Filing an appeal will require a claimant to file a brief with the court.61  If a 
party fails to file a brief, then the appealing party is considered to have 
“abandoned the appeal” and its case will be dismissed.62  The appellant’s initial 
brief must conform to the Missouri Supreme Court Rules.63  Specifically, it 
must conform to the many requirements found in Missouri Supreme Court 
Rule 84.64  Although courts are generally more understanding of a party who is 
proceeding pro se, a brief that fails to comply with the requirements of Rule 84 
and other Missouri Supreme Court Rules can result in the case being 
dismissed.65  The appealing claimant, after all briefs are filed, also may have to 
argue the case in open court.66  Oral argument may be waived in some 
jurisdictions, but if either party requests oral argument it is generally ordered.67  
If oral argument is ordered, therefore, an appealing claimant must argue the 
law applicable to the case in front of a panel of judges.68 
The appellate process is very complicated and arduous.  Moreover, there 
are skilled attorneys that dedicate their entire practice to appellate law.  It 
would be very difficult, if not impossible, for a pro se claimant to be successful 
in any appellate court in Missouri, especially considering the courts have 
 
 60. Id. 
 61. MO. SUP. CT. R. 84.035(g); see Vaughn v. Table Rock Asphalt Constr. Co., 984 S.W.2d 
215, 216 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) (“Requirements of rule governing appellate briefs are 
mandatory. . . .  An appellant that does not file a brief on the issues pertaining to its appeal is 
deemed to have abandoned that appeal.”) (citing Brachter v. Sequel Corp., 969 S.W.2d 827, 828 
(Mo. Ct. App. 1998)). 
 62. See Vaughn, 984 S.W.2d at 16. 
 63. MO. SUP. CT. R. 84.04. 
 64. Id.  The appellant’s brief must begin with a cover page, must contain a table of contents, 
table of authorities, jurisdictional statement, statement of facts, points relied on, argument, 
conclusion, and certification of service.  Id. R. 84.04(a); id. R. 84.06(f).  The rules specify what 
information each of these sections must contain, and how each of them must be formatted.  Id. R. 
84.04(a).  Moreover, in an appeal from a decision of the Commission it is likely the brief would 
need to include an appendix.  See id. R. 84.04(h).  An appellant’s initial brief cannot exceed 
31,000 words, or 2,200 lines of text, and cannot be longer than one hundred pages.  See id. R. 
84.06(b), (e). 
 65. See, e.g., Rainey v. Express Med. Transporters, Inc., 254 S.W.3d 905, 908 (Mo. Ct. App. 
2008).  Also, local court rules not included in the codified Supreme Court Rules can affect the 
requirements for formatting, filing, and length of the brief, as well as the requirements of oral 
arguments.  See MO. APPELLATE COURT PRACTICE §§ 6.2, 6.15, 6.17 (MoBar 5th ed. 2007). 
 66. See MO. CT. APP. E.D. SPEC. R. 390, 395; MO. CT. APP. S.D. SPEC. R. 1(b); MO. CT. 
APP. W.D. SPEC. R. I. 
 67. See MO. CT. APP. E.D. SPEC. R. 390, 395; MO. CT. APP. S.D. SPEC. R. 1(b); MO. CT. 
APP. W.D. SPEC. R. I. 
 68. See MO. CT. APP. E.D. SPEC. R. 390, 395; MO. CT. APP. S.D. SPEC. R. 1(b); MO. CT. 
APP. W.D. SPEC. R. I. 
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signaled a willingness to dismiss pro se claimants’ cases for failure to comply 
with Missouri Supreme Court Rules.69  Navigating the labyrinth that is the 
appeals process within the Commission is difficult enough.  Moreover, when 
the Commission errs, the process a claimant must go through to get access to 
entitled benefits only becomes more complicated.  Combined, these processes 
present insurmountable problems for many unemployed individuals, especially 
those that cannot attain representation.70 
As this Comment will discuss in subsequent pages, when the Commission 
fails to appropriately apply the law, it effectively denies benefits to individuals 
who deserve them.  In fact, it is this exact type of failure by the Commission 
that has created an unemployment crisis in Missouri.  The following section 
will discuss how personal illness affected the voluntary quit analysis prior to 
Difatta-Wheaton, the same law the Commission is still erroneously applying 
today. 
II.  WHAT THE LAW WAS—”VOLUNTARY” QUIT PRIOR TO DIFATTA-WHEATON 
A. Personal Illness as Voluntarily Quitting 
The Missouri statute on unemployment insurance, Section 288.050.1, 
disqualifies an individual from receiving unemployment insurance benefits if 
“the claimant has left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to such 
work or to the claimant’s employer.”71  Prior to Difatta-Wheaton, courts 
interpreted the language of the statute to mean that, if an employee left work 
because of a personal illness, that employee had voluntarily quit, unless the 
court found that there was a causal connection between the employee’s illness 
and his work.72 
Courts reasoned that Section 288.050.1 “imposed dual elements” for a 
finding of disqualification from benefits.73  To be disqualified from benefits, 
the employee’s termination had to be “both voluntary and without good cause 
attributable” to the employee’s work or to the employer.74  Thus, the courts 
 
 69. See Rainey, 254 S.W.3d at 908 (holding that a pro se claimant’s appeal for 
unemployment benefits be dismissed because her brief failed to comply with Missouri Supreme 
Court Rules 84.04 (c) through (d) and 84.04(i)). 
 70. John J. Ammann, Attorney and Director of the Saint Louis University Law Clinic, stated 
that “for [pro se claimants] to handle their own appeal at the Commission level, write a brief that 
conforms to the rules, and handle their own case in the appellate courts, would be like asking me, 
an untrained mechanic, to change the transmission in my car.”  Interview with John J. Ammann, 
Dir., Saint Louis Univ. Legal Clinic, in St. Louis, Mo. (Jan. 28, 2010). 
 71. MO. REV. STAT. § 288.050.1 (Supp. 2011). 
 72. See Duffy v. Labor & Indus. Relations Comm’n, 556 S.W.2d 195, 198 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1977). 
 73. Id. (citing Bussman Mfg. Co. v. Indus. Comm’n, 335 S.W.2d 456 (Mo. Ct. App. 1960)). 
 74. Id. 
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came to the conclusion that the statutory language “without good cause 
attributable to her work or her employer” defined, at least in part, the term 
“voluntarily.”75  Under this interpretation, termination of employment was only 
involuntary if there was a “legally sufficient reason for leaving which [was] 
causally connected to the work or the employer.”76  A personal illness of the 
employee, unrelated to his employment, would “not render termination 
involuntary unless the illness was caused or aggravated by the work or the 
employer.”77  Thus, an individual who had a personal illness, and as a result 
was unable to work, could not receive unemployment benefits, unless the 
employee could prove that the condition was caused by, or made worse by, the 
employee’s job.78 
In Duffy v. Labor and Industrial Relations Commission, a seminal 
unemployment case decided prior to Difatta-Wheaton, the court denied an 
employee unemployment insurance benefits.79  Ms. Duffy was a secretary at 
the Saint Louis University Medical School.80  Ms. Duffy could not go to work 
at the medical school because she had a serious personal illness that required 
daily care at a local hospital.81  Ms. Duffy called her supervisor at the medical 
school to notify him of the situation and to tell him that she did not know how 
long the illness would persist.82  Ms. Duffy’s supervisor considered this to be a 
voluntary resignation.83  Ms. Duffy’s subsequent claim for unemployment 
insurance benefits was denied by the Commission, and she appealed.84 
On appeal from the circuit court’s judgment affirming the Commission’s 
denial of unemployment benefits, Ms. Duffy argued that she had been forced 
to leave work through no fault of her own because her illness was not her 
fault.85  She contended that she should receive benefits because this was 
consistent with the “no fault” language found in the unemployment insurance 
statute.86  The court, however, denied Ms. Duffy unemployment insurance 
benefits, despite the fact that Ms. Duffy had been forced to leave work because 
of an illness and despite the fact she had contacted her supervisor to notify him 
of the situation.87  The court found that there was no evidence that Ms. Duffy’s 
 
 75. Id. 
 76. Duffy, 556 S.W.2d at 198. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 197. 
 81. Duffy, 556 S.W.2d at 197. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Duffy, 556 S.W.2d at 197 (quoting MO. REV. STAT. § 288.020(1) (2005)). 
 87. Id. at 197, 198. 
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illness was caused by her job or that her job aggravated the illness.88  Thus, the 
court decided that, even though Ms. Duffy had to miss work through no fault 
of her own, she had still left work voluntarily under Section 288.050.1(1).89 
In Wimberley v. Labor and Industrial Relations Commission, the Missouri 
Supreme Court held that a woman who had to leave work because of her 
pregnancy was disqualified from receiving unemployment insurance benefits.90  
Ms. Wimberley was a cashier and sales clerk at J.C. Penney Company for three 
years before she became pregnant.91  In August 1980, during her seventh 
month of pregnancy, Ms. Wimberley requested a leave of absence due to the 
pregnancy, and the employer granted the request, but with no guarantee of 
reinstatement.92  Ms. Wimberley’s child was born on November 5, 1980, and 
one month later, when Ms. Wimberley attempted to return to work, she was 
informed that there were no positions open.93  Ms. Wimberley applied for 
unemployment insurance benefits and was denied by the Division of 
Employment Security.94  She appealed the decision to the Appeals Tribunal.95 
On appeal, the Tribunal held that, although Ms. Wimberley had a legally 
sufficient reason for leaving her job, “that reason was in no way attributable to 
her work or to her employer.”96  Thus, the Tribunal held that she was 
disqualified from receiving benefits.97  The Labor and Industrial Relations 
Commission adopted the decision of the Appeals Tribunal and affirmed the 
denial of benefits.98 
Ms. Wimberley then petitioned the circuit court to review the decision.99  
The circuit court reversed the decision of the Commission, and the Western 
District of Missouri affirmed.100  The Missouri Supreme Court, however, 
reversed the decision of the Western District and affirmed the holding and 
reasoning of the Commission.101  The court found that Ms. Wimberley’s work 
and her pregnancy were not “causally connected,” because her job was not the 
 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Wimberley v. Labor & Indus. Relations Comm’n, 688 S.W.2d 344, 345 (Mo. 1985) (en 
banc). 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Wimberley, 688 S.W.2d at 345. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Wimberley, 688 S.W.2d at 345–46. 
 101. Id. at 350. 
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cause of her becoming pregnant.102  Thus, she had left work voluntarily and 
was not entitled to receive unemployment benefits.103 
B. The Elemental Approach to Denying Benefits Because of a Personal 
Illness 
Not all Missouri courts followed the exact line of reasoning laid out in 
Duffy and Wimberley.  The end result, however, was largely the same: 
employees who left work because of illnesses were disqualified from 
unemployment insurance benefits.104  Some Missouri courts read Section 
288.050.1 as raising three distinct issues: 1) “Was there a voluntary quitting”; 
2) if so, was there a “good cause”; and 3) if both were found, “was the good 
cause attributable to the claimant’s work or his employer?”105 
1. Voluntarily Quitting 
The first facet to the elemental approach prior to Difatta-Wheaton was a 
determination of whether the employee was removed from his job or left work 
on his own accord, i.e., “self-termination.”106  In many instances, the court 
would disqualify the employee from receiving benefits without analyzing the 
last two elements because the courts viewed not following an employer’s 
reporting or leave of absence policy as a “self-termination.”107  Moreover, 
courts have held that not reporting a personal illness, and the subsequent need 
to be absent from work to the employer, was per se a voluntary quit and 
disqualified the employee from benefits without considering any of the other 
elements.108  However, when dealing generally with a case where an employee 
left work due to an illness, if the examining court determined that the 
separation was “voluntary” (i.e., it was caused by the employee leaving due to 
the illness and not some act of the employer), then the court examined the 
question of whether there was a “good cause,” and if there was a “causal 
 
 102. Id. at 346 
 103. Id. 
 104. See, e.g., Mo. Forge, Inc. v. Turner, 118 S.W.3d 313, 316 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003) (denying 
a claimant benefits because his back injury, which he claimed as good cause for quitting, was not 
sufficiently attributable to his work or his employer). 
 105. Trail v. Indus. Comm’n, Div. of Emp’t. Sec. of Dept. of Labor & Indus. Relations, 540 
S.W.2d 179, 181 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976) (citing S. Cent. Bell Tel. Co. v. Admin. Div. of Emp’t Sec., 
Dept. of Labor, 247 So. 2d 615, 617 (La. Ct. App. 1971)). 
 106. See Reutzel v. Mo. Div. of Emp’t Sec., 955 S.W.2d 239, 242 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997). 
 107. See id. at 241–42. 
 108. Turner v. Labor & Indus. Relations Comm’n, 793 S.W.2d 191, 195 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) 
(holding that it was “clear that the direct and immediate cause of claimant’s unemployment was 
her inaction in not notifying her employer of any need to be absent, or intent to be absent for 
more than three consecutive days after checking out of the hospital against medical advice,” and 
thus, she was not entitled to benefits). 
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connection” between the separation and the work performed.109  If the court 
could find facts to support the last two elements, then unemployment insurance 
benefits would still be available.110 
2. Good Cause 
Prior to Difatta-Wheaton, “[a] worker ha[d] good cause to terminate [his or 
her] employment when that conduct conform[ed] to what an average person, 
who acts with reasonableness and in good faith, would do.”111  Generally, to 
establish “good faith,” the employee had to prove that a reasonable effort was 
made to “resolve the dispute before resorting to the drastic remedy of quitting 
his or her job.”112  “Good cause” was “limited to instances where the 
unemployment [was] caused by external pressures so compelling that a 
reasonably prudent person would be justified in giving up employment.”113  In 
the context of personal illness, “good cause” meant that it would be 
unreasonable to expect the employee to continue working given their health 
condition.114  Thus, many illnesses and medical conditions were held not to 
constitute good cause, and the claimants were denied benefits without further 
analysis.115  However, even if the medical condition was recognized as a good 
cause in a general sense, if the good faith part of the element was not satisfied, 
the court would hold that the employee had not left work for “good cause.”116 
In Hessler v. Labor and Industrial Relations Commission, the Missouri 
Supreme Court held that a pregnant woman, who had left work because of 
complications related to her pregnancy, had not left her employment for a 
 
 109. Hessler v. Labor & Indus. Relations Comm’n, 851 S.W.2d 516, 518 (Mo. 1993) (en 
banc). 
 110. Id. 
 111. See Clark v. Labor & Indus. Relations Comm’n, 875 S.W.2d 624, 627 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1994) (citing Contractors Supply Co. v. Labor & Indus. Relations Comm’n, 614 S.W.2d 563, 564 
(Mo. Ct. App. 1981)). 
 112. Id. (quoting Tin Man Enters., Inc. v. Labor & Indus. Relations Comm’n, 866 S.W.2d 
147, 149 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993)). 
 113. Id. (quoting Div. of Emp’t Sec. v Labor & Indus. Relations Comm’n, 625 S.W.2d 882, 
884 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981)). 
 114. Hessler, 851 S.W.2d at 518. 
 115. See, e.g., id. at 518–19 (holding that the claimant’s health condition was not a good 
cause); Wimberly v. Labor & Indus. Relations Comm’n, 688 S.W.2d 344, 345 (Mo. 1985) (en 
banc) (holding that the inability to work because of pregnancy was not a good cause); Kansas 
City Power & Light Co. v. Searcy, 28 S.W.3d 891, 896 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that 
medical evidence presented was not sufficient to show good cause); Fifer v. Mo. Div. of Emp’t 
Sec., 665 S.W.2d 81, 81 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (reasoning that an extended absence because of 
illness was not a good cause for termination); Clevenger v. Labor & Indus. Relations Comm’n, 
600 S.W.2d 675, 676 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (holding that an emotional or mental condition was not 
good cause). 
 116. Hessler, 851 S.W.2d at 519. 
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“good cause.”117  Ms. Hessler was a billing clerk and receptionist for Suburban 
Business Products.118  During her employment she became pregnant and 
started having complications including severe vaginal bleeding and a 
threatened abortion.119  These complications stemmed from job stress and 
being on her feet, so Ms. Hessler’s doctor ordered her to stay home, off of her 
feet, and she was eventually bed ridden.120  Thus, Ms. Hessler was forced to 
quit her job.121  Upon quitting, Ms. Hessler did not specify to her employer 
what her doctor’s orders were, nor did she tell her employer of the specifics of 
her pregnancy complications, until her doctor sent the company a note 
detailing her complications and his recommendation that she stay in bed.122  
The Missouri Supreme Court denied Ms. Hessler’s request for unemployment 
benefits because she had not shown a “good cause” for leaving her 
employment.123 
The court held that, even if it assumed that Ms. Hessler’s pregnancy 
complications made leaving her job reasonable, it could not award her 
unemployment benefits because she did not act in good faith.124  Moreover, the 
court held that Ms. Hessler had to show that her pregnancy complications 
necessitated her leaving work and that she gave her employer appropriate time 
and chance to provide her with a less stressful work environment and a job that 
she could do off of her feet, before she quit.125  However, the court failed to 
mention how long Ms. Hessler should have continued to work to afford her 
employer appropriate time to find her a different job.  Since Ms. Hessler had 
not given them adequate time, the court held the vaginal bleeding and 
threatened abortion resulting from Ms. Hessler’s pregnancy complications 
were not “good cause” for leaving work, and Ms. Hessler was disqualified 
from receiving benefits.126 
Under the “good cause” element, the employee had to show (1) that it 
would be unreasonable for his employer to expect him to continue working 
given his health condition, and (2) that he gave the employer an adequate 
opportunity to find a job that he could perform.127  Otherwise, the employee 
was not entitled to benefits.128  However, even if the employee was able to 
 
 117. See id. at 518–19. 
 118. Id. at 517. 
 119. Id. at 517–18. 
 120. Id. at 518. 
 121. Hessler, 851 S.W.2d at 518. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 519. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 518–19. 
 126. Hessler, 851 S.W.2d at 519. 
 127. Id. at 518–19. 
 128. Id. at 519. 
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prove both good cause elements, he would still have to show that there was a 
causal connection between his illness and the work.129 
3. Causal Connection 
Prior to Difatta-Wheaton, an employee also had to show a causal 
connection between his illness and his employment.130  Section 288.050.1 
states that if “the claimant has left work voluntarily without good cause 
attributable to such work or to the claimant’s employer,” then he is disqualified 
from receiving benefits.131  Courts interpreted “[a]ttributable to . . . work or 
to . . . employer” to mean that it “must be the work or the employer himself 
that creates the condition making it unreasonable to expect this employee to 
continue work.”132  “Work causing an aggravation of an existing condition 
[was] also sufficient” to fulfill the causal connection element.133 
However, this causal connection generally had to be demonstrated with 
medical evidence.134  Courts held that, where the causal connection between 
the employee’s work and the medical reason relied upon for establishing good 
cause for quitting was not within the “common knowledge or experience of a 
layperson,” expert medical evidence was required to establish the causal 
connection.135  Where the causal connection was within the common 
knowledge or experience of a layperson, expert medical evidence was not 
needed.136  However, courts have held that medical evidence was necessary in 
most cases.137  For example, medical evidence was found necessary for claims 
regarding workplace aggravation of “injuries to the body”138 and in several 
cases regarding mental and emotional illnesses.139  Thus, generally, if an 
employee quit a job and sought unemployment insurance benefits “alleging 
 
 129. Id. at 518. 
 130. See Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. Searcy, 28 S.W.3d 891, 894 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000). 
 131. MO. REV. STAT. § 288.050.1 (Supp. 2011). 
 132. Mena v. Consentino Grp., Inc., 233 S.W.3d 800, 804 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007) (quoting 
Baker v. Midway Enters., Inc., 78 S.W.3d 188, 192 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002)). 
 133. Id. (citing Bussmann Mfg. Co. v. Indus. Comm’n, 327 S.W.2d 487, 491 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1959)). 
 134. See id. 
 135. Id. (quoting Smith v. U.S. Postal Serv., 69 S.W.3d 926, 928 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002)). 
 136. Id. 
 137. See Mena, 233 S.W.3d at 804. 
 138. Id. at 804 (“See Mo. Forge, Inc. v. Turner, 118 S.W.3d 313, 316 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003) 
(requiring expert medical evidence to show that back pain was aggravated by the claimant’s 
employment); VanDrie v. Performance Contracting & Div. of Emp’t Sec., 992 S.W.2d 369, 374 
(Mo. Ct. App. 1999) (noting that the claimant did not meet his burden of establishing by 
sufficient medical evidence the causal connection between his preexisting back injury and the 
workplace aggravation of that injury)”). 
 139. See, e.g., Mena, 233 S.W.3d at 804 (discussing “many cases” requiring medical 
evidence). 
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medical reasons as good cause for quitting,” the employee had to provide 
expert medical evidence as a way to prove the causal connection between “the 
employee’s work and the medical reason relied on.”140 
In Hessler, mentioned above, the Missouri Supreme Court held that even if 
Ms. Hessler had shown that her pregnancy complications constituted a “good 
cause” for leaving her job, she still would have been disqualified from 
receiving unemployment benefits because she failed to fulfill the causal 
connection element.141  The court reasoned that the statute’s purpose was to 
incentivize employees to stay at their jobs and to only allow unemployment 
benefits when the cause was “real, not imaginary, substantial, not trifling, and 
reasonable, not whimsical.”142  The court determined that Section 288.050 
required that good cause be attributable to Ms. Hessler’s work or to her 
employer, which meant “it must be the work or employer himself that creates 
the condition making it unreasonable to expect this employee to continue 
work.”143  So, since Ms. Hessler’s work did not cause her to become pregnant, 
the complications arising from her pregnancy were not causally connected to 
her work.144  Moreover, the court ignored the statements of Ms. Hessler and 
her doctor, indicating that the stress of her job made her pregnancy 
complications worse.145  Thus, the court held that Ms. Hessler was disqualified 
from receiving benefits despite the fact that she was experiencing severe 
pregnancy complications that were not her fault and that were exacerbated by 
her job.146 
The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District, in Mena v. 
Consentino Group, Inc., held that the employee had failed to produce enough 
medical evidence to support the causal connection element.147  Ms. Mena’s job 
as a cashier at a Price Choppers grocery store required her to stand for long 
periods of time.148  Ms. Mena had arthritic knees and standing for long periods 
caused her significant pain.149  Her employer denied her request for a stool to 
 
 140. Id. (quoting Smith, 69 S.W.3d at 928).  For a brief explanation of the proof requirement 
under the causal connection element and what types of proof may or may not be needed after 
Difatta-Wheaton, see Appellant’s Brief and Appendix at 17, Davis v. Transp. Sec. & Div. of 
Emp’t Sec., 295 S.W.3d 594 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009) (No. ED 92287). 
 141. Hessler v. Labor & Indus. Relations Comm’n, 851 S.W.2d 516, 519 (Mo. 1993) (en 
banc). 
 142. Id. at 518 (quoting Belle State Bank v. Indus. Comm’n, 547 S.W.2d 841, 846 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1977)). 
 143. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 144. Id. at 518–519. 
 145. Id. at 518. 
 146. Hessler, 851 S.W.2d at 518–19. 
 147. Mena v. Consentino Grp., Inc., 233 S.W.3d 800, 806 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007). 
 148. Id. at 802. 
 149. Id. 
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sit on, telling her that if she wanted a stool she should find a new job.150  Thus, 
Ms. Mena was forced to leave her employment.151  She subsequently filed for 
unemployment benefits.152  At the Appeals Tribunal hearing, Ms. Mena 
produced a medical certificate from her doctor that diagnosed her with 
osteoarthritis of the knees and restricted her to lifting or pushing fifty 
pounds.153  She also produced a form, filled out by her doctor, requesting 
handicapped automobile license plates because she could not walk more than 
fifty feet without resting.154  In addition, Ms. Mena informed the Commission 
that her doctor advised her to quit if she would have to continue standing at her 
job, and she produced a medical certificate that indicated she could not stand 
continuously for more than one hour.155  However, the Commission denied Ms. 
Mena benefits because she failed to produce enough medical evidence to show 
a causal connection indicating that her job made her illness worse.156 
The appellate court affirmed the Commission’s findings.157  The court 
reasoned that there was insufficient medical evidence to show that Ms. Mena’s 
arthritis was made worse by standing at the cashier’s station, holding that even 
if her doctor’s verbal statement—advising Ms. Mena to leave her job—had 
been in writing, it would not have been enough evidence to prove a “causal 
connection.”158  The court stated that the doctor’s statement was only a 
“suggestion” and not “medical evidence of an aggravated condition.”159  The 
court held that it would need a statement from Ms. Mena’s medical doctor 
specifically stating that the existing medical condition was made worse by Ms. 
Mena’s employment, requiring her to quit.160  Absent such a statement, the 
court reasoned it could not hold that the causal connection element was 
satisfied.161  Thus, the court held that Ms. Mena was not entitled to 
unemployment benefits, even though she demonstrated that she had a serious 
medical condition which limited her physical abilities and that her doctor had 
advised her to quit her job.162 
 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Mena, 233 S.W.3d at 802. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. (explaining that the medical certificate, which stated that Ms. Mena could not stand 
for more than an hour, was made after she left her job and was not given to the Appeals Tribunal; 
however, it was provided to the Commission and the Court of Appeals). 
 156. Id. at 803. 
 157. Mena, 233 S.W.3d at 806. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Mena, 233 S.W.3d at 806. 
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In Difatta-Wheaton, the Missouri Supreme Court took a drastically 
different approach to analyzing whether and employee had left work 
voluntarily.  Unlike in Duffy163 and Wimberley,164 where the courts disqualified 
an ill receptionist and a woman with pregnancy complications, respectively, 
even though the women left work through no fault of their own, in Difatta-
Wheaton the Missouri Supreme Court looked to the purpose of the statute, 
which was to protect individuals who had lost their jobs “through no fault of 
their own.”165  Rather than disqualifying a woman suffering from severe 
pregnancy complications because she did not give her employer adequate time 
to find her an alternative job or because the job was not the direct cause of her 
pregnancy, as the court did in Hessler,166 the court looked at the plain meaning 
of the terms of Section 288 and the public policy that was purportedly behind 
the statute’s passage.167  Accordingly, rather than disqualifying a woman with 
arthritic knees because she failed to provide a specific type of medical 
evidence, as the court did in Mena,168 the court supplanted the previous 
elemental approach in favor of a new analysis that considers the true policy 
goals of unemployment insurance statutes. 
III.  WHAT THE LAW IS—DIFATTA-WHEATON AND SUBSEQUENT CASES 
CHANGE THE “VOLUNTARY” QUIT ANALYSIS 
A. The Supreme Court’s Analysis in Difatta-Wheaton 
The Missouri Supreme Court fundamentally changed how illness and 
medical conditions of an employee affect the voluntary quit determination.  
Amy Difatta-Wheaton was a sales representative with the Dolphin Capital 
Corporation.169  In 2006, Ms. Difatta-Wheaton was diagnosed with ovarian 
cancer.170  Because of complications stemming from her ovarian cancer, 
including excessive bleeding and severe pain, Ms. Difatta-Wheaton was forced 
to take a medical leave of absence from May 24 to May 29, 2006.171  However, 
the night before her scheduled return to work, Ms. Difatta-Wheaton began 
suffering severe cancer-related complications and was forced to miss 
additional days of work to receive “emergency medical treatment she needed 
 
 163. See supra notes 79–89 and accompanying text. 
 164. See supra notes 90–103 and accompanying text. 
 165. Difatta-Wheaton v. Dolphin Capital Corp., 271 S.W.3d 594, 598 (Mo. 2008) (en banc) 
(citing MO. REV. STAT. § 288.020.1 (2000)). 
 166. See supra notes 117–29, 141–46 and accompanying text. 
 167. Difatta-Wheaton, 271 S.W.3d at 597–98. 
 168. See supra notes 147–62 and accompanying text. 
 169. Difatta-Wheaton, 271 S.W.3d at 595. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
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to save her life.”172  Although Ms. Difatta-Wheaton contacted her employer 
several times to notify it that she would be forced to miss additional days of 
work, she was terminated.173  Subsequently, Ms. Difatta-Wheaton filed a claim 
for unemployment insurance benefits.174 
Applying the pre-Difatta-Wheaton reasoning, the Deputy for the Division 
of Employment Security found that Ms. Difatta-Wheaton was disqualified 
from receiving unemployment benefits because her actions amounted to a 
“voluntary quit.”175  That is, Ms. Difatta-Wheaton had left her job voluntarily 
because no causal connection was found between her cancer and her job at 
Dolphin Capital.176  This finding was affirmed and adopted by both the 
Appeals Tribunal and the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission.177  
However, Ms. Difatta-Wheaton, with the help of an appointed attorney acting 
pro bono, appealed the Commission’s decision.178  Ultimately, the Missouri 
Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Commission.179  The court held 
that because Ms. Difatta-Wheaton was not responsible for her ovarian cancer, 
its complications, or the timing of their occurrence, and she took necessary 
steps to preserve her employment given “uncontrollable factors,” that she left 
work through “no fault” of her own, and did not do so voluntarily.180  Thus, the 
court granted her unemployment benefits.181 
In reaching its decision the court took a fundamentally new approach.  
Rather than disqualifying Ms. Difatta-Wheaton from benefits because her 
ovarian cancer was not caused by her job, as the Commission had done when 
applying Duffy, the Missouri Supreme Court looked at the plain meaning of 
Section 288’s terms and the public policy behind the statute’s passage.182  The 
Missouri Supreme Court thought it was imperative to decipher the meaning of 
leaving work “voluntarily” in light of Section 288’s goals, which are to provide 
 
 172. Id. at 594–95. 
 173. Id. at 595 (in repeatedly attempting to notify her employer of her illness, Ms. Difatta-
Wheaton left a message with her supervisor on the morning of May 29, had her doctor fax a 
statement regarding her condition to Dolphin Capital on May 29, had her friend deliver a doctor’s 
note to Dolphin Capital, and had her boyfriend deliver another doctor’s note on June 5). 
 174. Difatta-Wheaton, 271 S.W.3d at 595. 
 175. Id. (stating the deputy’s agreement with Dolphin Capital’s assessment that Ms. Difatta-
Wheaton had resigned because of unexcused absences between May 29 and June 5, 2009). 
 176. Id. at 597. 
 177. Id. at 595. 
 178. Id. at 594, n.1 (court expressing its appreciation to attorney Susan Ford Robertson for 
representing Ms. Difatta-Wheaton pro bono). 
 179. Difatta-Wheaton, 271 S.W.3d at 599. 
 180. Id. at 598–99. 
 181. Id. at 599. 
 182. Id. at 597–98. 
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assistance to employees who have become unemployed through no fault of 
their own.183 
The court first looked at the public policy behind the statute to determine 
the meaning of “voluntarily.”184  More specifically, the court examined the 
public policy goals stated in the public policy statement of Section 288.185  The 
statute stated that the purpose of the legislation was to benefit “persons 
unemployed through no fault of their own.”186  The court determined that the 
word “fault,” as used in the statute, meant “responsibility for wrongdoing or 
failure.”187  Further, the court noted that the legislature said that “[t]his law 
shall be liberally construed to accomplish its purpose.”188  In other words, the 
court reasoned that the legislature “sought to provide help to those who were 
not themselves to blame for their unemployment” and “to have courts construe 
the specific provisions of Missouri’s employment security law accordingly.”189  
With these policy objectives in mind, the court then looked at the term 
“voluntarily” in Section 288.050.1(1).190 
The court held that the term “voluntarily,” in light of the statute’s “plain 
language,” meant “proceeding from the will: produced in or by an act of 
choice.”191  Based on this interpretation and the stated public policy in the 
statute, the court found previous Missouri cases holding that “leaving 
employment for a non-work-related illness is, as a matter of law, leaving work 
voluntarily,” to be inconsistent with the statute.192  Thus, the court held that 
leaving work because of an illness, even if that illness was not caused or 
exacerbated by the employee’s job, was not “voluntary” under Section 
288.050.1(1), so long as the employee takes necessary steps, in light of 
 
 183. Id. (quoting Abrams v. Ohio Pac. Express, 819 S.W.2d 338, 340 (Mo. 1991) (en banc) 
(“The primary role of courts in construing statutes is to ascertain the intent of the legislature from 
the language used in the statute and, if possible, give effect to that intent.”)). 
 184. Difatta-Wheaton, 271 S.W.3d at 598. 
 185. Id. at 598 (emphasis omitted) (quoting MO. REV. STAT. § 288.020.1 (2000)). 
 186. MO. REV. STAT. § 288.020.1 (2000). 
 187. Difatta-Wheaton, 271 S.W.3d at 598. 
 188. Id. (quoting MO. REV. STAT. § 288.020.2 (2000)). 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2564 (unabridged 
ed. 1993)). 
 192. Difatta-Wheaton, 271 S.W.3d at 598 (citing MO. REV. STAT. §§ 288.020, 288.050.1(1) 
(Supp. 2000)).  With this holding, the Missouri Supreme Court specifically disaffirmed such 
language in Wimberly v. Labor & Industrial Relations Commission, 688 S.W.2d 344, 346 (Mo. 
1985), Lake v. Labor & Industrial Relations Commission, 781 S.W.2d 207, 208 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1989), Fifer v. Missouri Division of Employment Security, 665 S.W.2d 81, 82 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1984), Duffy v. Labor & Industrial Relations Commission, 556 S.W.2d 195, 198 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1977), and Bussmann Manufacturing Co. v. Industrial Commission, 335 S.W.2d 456, 461 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 1960).  Difatta-Wheaton, 271 S.W.3d at 597, 598 n.7. 
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“uncontrollable factors” stemming from his illness, to preserve his 
employment.193 
Specifically, the court held that Ms. Difatta-Wheaton did not leave her job 
voluntarily for two reasons.194  First, Ms. Difatta-Wheaton was forced to miss 
work because of her ovarian cancer, which was not her “fault.”195  The court 
reasoned that it could not be said that Ms. Difatta-Wheaton “made a choice or 
was otherwise responsible for her ovarian cancer, its complications, or the 
timing of their occurrence.”196  Secondly, the court held that Ms. Difatta-
Wheaton took necessary and appropriate steps to preserve her employment, 
especially given the circumstances with which she was dealing.197  Therefore, 
the court ultimately held that “it would be inconsistent with the statutory 
language of ‘no fault’ and ‘voluntarily’” to deny Ms. Difatta-Wheaton 
unemployment insurance benefits because she voluntarily left work.198 
Based on the Missouri Supreme Court’s interpretation of Missouri’s 
unemployment insurance statutes, and its ultimate holding in Difatta-Wheaton, 
the court has supplanted old approaches to determining whether an employee 
has voluntarily left work when a personal illness is involved.  Rather than 
disqualifying the employee from benefits because the illness was not caused, 
or made worse by, the employee’s job, or analyzing the three elements to see if 
there was a “voluntary quit,” the Missouri Supreme Court has adopted a new 
elemental approach.199  The court has held that an employee is entitled to 
unemployment benefits if: 1) the employee suffers from a personal illness 
which is the reason that he cannot work; and 2) the employee takes necessary 
and reasonable steps, considering the circumstances and uncontrollable factors 
that result from his illness, to preserve his employment.200 
The Difatta-Wheaton approach broadens access to unemployment 
insurance benefits to many employees who would have been denied access 
under previous approaches, including employees who would have been 
disqualified in the past because their illness was not related to their work.  For 
example, the employee in Duffy, who had to receive daily treatments at the 
 
 193. Difatta-Wheaton, 271 S.W.3d at 599. 
 194. Id. at 598–99. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. at 599. 
 197. Id.  Ms. Difatta-Wheaton left a message with her supervisor on the morning of May 29, 
had her doctor fax a statement regarding her condition to Dolphin Capital on May 29, had her 
friend deliver a doctor’s note to Dolphin Capital, and had her boyfriend deliver another doctor’s 
note on June 5, despite being severely ill.  Id. at 595. 
 198. Difatta-Wheaton, 271 S.W.3d at 599. 
 199. See id. at 598–99. 
 200. See id. 
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hospital,201 would no longer have to prove her illness was causally connected 
with her work and could now receive benefits.  Similarly, the employees in 
Wimberley and Hessler could no longer be excluded from receiving benefits 
because their jobs did not cause their pregnancy,202 or because they did not 
give their employer enough time to find them an alternative job when faced 
with a threatened abortion.203  Moreover, Difatta-Wheaton does not require 
expert medical evidence to show the “causal connection” element because it is 
no longer a part of the analysis.204  This lessens the burden of proof on 
employees seeking benefits by allowing them to receive unemployment 
without proving their medical condition caused them to quit work or that their 
job exacerbated their illness.205  For example, the arthritic plaintiff in Mena 
would not be disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits because she 
failed to produce a specific type of medical evidence.  It would now be enough 
to demonstrate that she had the arthritis and that she tried to maintain her 
employment.206 
It is evident that Difatta-Wheaton will expand access to Missouri’s 
unemployment insurance benefits and will fundamentally change Missouri’s 
unemployment insurance law.  What effect has the Difatta-Wheaton decision 
had in Missouri thus far?  Have the courts adopted Difatta-Wheaton?  Has the 
Labor and Industrial Relations Commission adopted the new policy?  How has 
all of this affected Missouri residents seeking unemployment benefits?  These 
are the questions that the remainder of this Comment will seek to address. 
B. The Courts Support Difatta-Wheaton 
Difatta-Wheaton was decided in December 2008.207  So, it is difficult to 
gauge what long-lasting impact the case will have on access to Missouri’s 
unemployment insurance benefits.  However, even though the policy shift 
 
 201. See Duffy v. Labor & Indus. Relations Comm’n, 556 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1977). 
 202. See Hessler v. Labor & Indus. Relations Comm’n, 851 S.W.2d 516, 518–19 (Mo. 1993) 
(en banc); Wimberley v. Labor & Indus. Relations Comm’n, 688 S.W.2d 344, 345 (Mo. 1985) 
(en banc). 
 203. Hessler, 851 S.W.2d at 518–19. 
 204. See Difatta-Wheaton, 271 S.W.3d at 598–99. 
 205. There have been cases decided post-Difatta-Wheaton that have lessened the expert 
medical evidence requirement.  See, e.g., Hernandez v. Staffing Solutions, Inc., 295 S.W.3d 564, 
567 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009) (holding that expert medical evidence was not needed, and common 
knowledge would suffice). 
 206. Mena v. Consentino Grp., Inc., 233 S.W.3d 800, 802 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007) (finding that 
Ms. Mena did try to preserve her employment by asking for a stool and discussing her condition 
with her employer). 
 207. Difatta-Wheaton, 271 S.W.3d at 594. 
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Difatta-Wheaton represents has been short-lived, it has already begun to widen 
access to unemployment benefits at the judicial level. 
In Hernandez v. Staffing Solutions, an employee was granted 
unemployment benefits by the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern 
District.208  Ms. Hernandez, the employee, performed administrative work at 
Washington University in Saint Louis.209  During the time she worked at the 
university she became pregnant and began to experience back pain due to her 
pregnancy.210  Her pain was exacerbated by sitting for long periods of time, 
which her job required.211  Eventually, Ms. Hernandez was forced to leave her 
job because of pregnancy complications.212  However, the Labor and Industrial 
Relations Commission denied Ms. Hernandez unemployment benefits because 
her pregnancy, and the resulting complications, were not causally connected to 
her job.213  The Eastern District Court of Appeals overturned the 
Commission’s decision and remanded the case with instruction that Ms. 
Hernandez be awarded benefits.214  Rather than disqualifying Ms. Hernandez 
because her job was not the cause of her pregnancy, as the court did in 
Hessler215 and Wimberley,216 the court based its reasoning on Difatta-
Wheaton.217  The court reasoned that leaving work for a non-work-related 
illness is not a “per se . . . disqualification” from unemployment benefits.218  
Following Difatta-Wheaton, the court held that leaving work due to a personal 
illness can be considered involuntary if the employee lost their job “through no 
fault of her own.”219  Thus, because Ms. Hernandez’s pregnancy complications 
were not her fault, she was entitled to unemployment benefits.220  The Eastern 
District clearly adopted the policy of Difatta-Wheaton, thus, expressly 
overturning the Commission’s decision which relied on old policies found in 
Duffy,221 Wimberley,222 and Hessler.223 
The Eastern District Court of Appeals also followed the reasoning of 
Difatta-Wheaton in Davis v. Transportation Security and Division of 
 
 208. Hernandez, 295 S.W.3d at 566. 
 209. Id. at 565. 
 210. Id. at 566. 
 211. Id. at 565. 
 212. Id. at 566. 
 213. Hernandez, 295 S.W.3d at 567. 
 214. Id. 
 215. See supra notes 116–29, 141–46 and accompanying text. 
 216. See supra notes 90–103 and accompanying text. 
 217. Hernandez, 295 S.W.3d at 566–67. 
 218. Id. at 566. 
 219. Id. at 566–67. 
 220. Id. at 567. 
 221. See supra notes 79–89 and accompanying text. 
 222. See supra notes 90–103 and accompanying text. 
 223. See supra notes 117–29, 141–46 and accompanying text. 
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Employment Security.224  Ms. Davis, the employee, worked at Lambert 
International Airport in St. Louis, Missouri.225  During that time, she became 
pregnant and began to have severe complications.226  The complications 
included heavy vaginal bleeding and several instances in which Ms. Davis had 
to seek emergency medical treatment.227  Eventually, it was discovered that 
Ms. Davis’s pregnancy was ectopic and she was forced to terminate the 
pregnancy.228 However, her medical problems persisted after the 
termination.229  Ms. Davis still experienced severe pain, chest pains, and 
blurred vision, which precluded her from working.230  Because Ms. Davis was 
required to miss work due to her ectopic pregnancy and the complications after 
the termination of the pregnancy, she was fired.231  Ms. Davis subsequently 
applied for unemployment benefits and was denied by the Commission 
because, although she had a “good cause” for leaving her job, it “was not 
attributable to her work.”232  However, the Court of Appeals refused to follow 
the Commission’s error in applying the old policies found in Duffy,233 
Hessler,234 and Wimberley,235 and would not disqualify Ms. Davis because her 
job had not caused her pregnancy or its resulting complications.236 
The Eastern District Court of Appeals followed the Difatta-Wheaton 
analysis, stating that the two cases were “indistinguishable.”237  Borrowing 
language from Difatta-Wheaton, the court held that there was no evidence that 
Ms. Davis had “made a choice or was otherwise responsible for her [ectopic 
pregnancy], its complications, or the timing of their occurrence.”238  Thus, the 
court concluded that it was not Ms. Davis’s fault that she had become 
 
 224. See Davis v. Transp. Sec. & Div. of Emp’t Sec., 295 S.W.3d 594, 596–97 (Mo. Ct. App. 
2009). 
 225. Id. at 595. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id. 
 229. Davis, 295 S.W.3d at 595. 
 230. Id. 
 231. Id. 
 232. Id. at 595–96.  For a more detailed discussion of the errors in the Appeals Tribunal and 
Commission’s decisions, see Appellant’s Brief and Appendix at 12–23, Davis v. Transp. Sec. & 
Div. of Emp’t Sec., 295 S.W.3d 594 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009) (No. ED 92287). 
 233. See supra notes 79–89 and accompanying text. 
 234. See supra notes 117–29, 141–46 and accompanying text. 
 235. See supra notes 90–103 and accompanying text. 
 236. Davis, 295 S.W.3d at 596–97. 
 237. Id. at 596. 
 238. Id. at 596–97 (alteration in original) (quoting Difatta-Wheaton v. Dolphin Capital Corp., 
271 S.W.3d 594, 598 (Mo. 2008)). 
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unemployed.239  She had left work involuntarily and was, therefore, entitled to 
unemployment insurance benefits.240 
The Difatta-Wheaton policy shift was also recognized and followed in 
Korkutovic v. Gamel Company.241  Mr. Korkutovic, the employee, had non-
work-related problems with the arteries in his legs.242  Mr. Korkutovic gave his 
employer doctor’s notes with work restrictions stemming from his medical 
problem, and was subsequently fired.243  Even after being fired, Mr. 
Korkutovic tried to work out an arrangement where he could continue 
working; he even offered to ignore his doctor’s work restrictions and continue 
with his old job.244  However, Gamel Company refused to allow him to 
continue his employment.245  Under the old voluntary standard, Mr. 
Korkutovic would have been disqualified.246  For example, in Mena, the 
employee who was denied benefits had leg problems which were not work-
related,247 just like Mr. Korkutovic.248  Moreover, the employee in Mena failed 
to produce specific medical evidence that stated her work made her arthritis 
worse and that she should leave her job.249  Similarly, Mr. Korkutovic only 
produced medical evidence that his work was restricted because of his medical 
condition, not that he should leave his employment.250  Thus, under the old 
approach in Mena,251 Mr. Korkutovic would have been disqualified from 
receiving benefits.  However, the court expressly rejected this approach and 
held that Mr. Korkutovic was entitled to unemployment benefits.252 
The appellate court, following the reasoning of Difatta-Wheaton, held that 
Mr. Korkutovic was not responsible for his medical problems or the 
consequences that resulted from them.253  Thus, he was not responsible for his 
inability to do his job.254  Further, Mr. Korkutovic had attempted to preserve 
his employment, even going beyond what would be reasonable to ask of him, 
by asking to continue working despite his doctor’s recommendation.255  Thus, 
 
 239. Id. 
 240. See id. 
 241. Korkutovic v. Gamel Co., 284 S.W.3d 653, 658 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009). 
 242. Id. at 655. 
 243. Id. 
 244. Id. 
 245. Id. 
 246. See supra notes 73–78 and accompanying text. 
 247. Mena v. Consentino Grp., Inc., 233 S.W.3d 800, 803, 805 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007). 
 248. Korkutovic, 284 S.W.3d at 655. 
 249. Mena, 233 S.W.3d at 803. 
 250. Korkutovic, 284 S.W.3d at 658. 
 251. See supra notes 147–62 and accompanying text. 
 252. Korkutovic, 284 S.W.3d at 658. 
 253. Id. 
 254. Id. 
 255. Id. at 655, 658. 
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Mr. Korkutovic met the Difatta-Wheaton standard and was entitled to 
unemployment benefits.256 
The Southern District Court of Appeals has also accepted and applied 
Difatta-Wheaton.257  In Strahl, the court held that the Labor and Industrial 
Relations Commission made an “error of law” in denying benefits to the 
employee, Mr. Strahl.258  Mr. Strahl worked for the Transportation Security 
Administration.259  He suffered from chronic back problems and pneumonia.260  
Mr. Strahl’s back problems eventually required surgery, so his family doctor 
ordered him to take a number of days off of work prior to the surgery in order 
to rebuild his immune system, which had been affected by the pneumonia.261  
The doctor also put Mr. Strahl on a twenty-pound lifting restriction because of 
his back condition.262  This restriction prevented Mr. Strahl from performing 
his job duties, and therefore, Mr. Strahl felt he had no choice but to resign.263 
The Labor and Industrial Relations Commission denied Mr. Strahl 
unemployment benefits.264  The Commission stated that under Bussmann 
Manufacturing and Duffy, Mr. Strahl had to demonstrate that his back 
problems were a result of his work or were made worse by his work, which he 
had failed to do.265  Thus, the Commission held that he was not entitled to 
benefits.266  However, the Southern District Court of Appeals held that the 
Commission had made a fundamental “error of law” in applying the old Duffy 
standard.267  The court recognized that Difatta-Wheaton had specifically 
overturned the language in Duffy and Bussmann Manufacturing and that the 
“causal connection” standard found in those cases should no longer be 
applied.268  Thus, the court overturned the Commission’s decision and 
remanded the case to the Commission for further proceedings.269 
It is unclear the real breadth and depth of the change that Difatta-Wheaton 
will have on Missouri’s unemployment insurance law in the future.  What is 
clear is that Difatta-Wheaton represents an entirely new definition of 
 
 256. Id. at 658. 
 257. See Strahl v. Transp. Sec. Admin., 299 S.W.3d 298, 301 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007). 
 258. Id. 
 259. Id. at 299. 
 260. Id. 
 261. Id. 
 262. Strahl, 299 S.W.3d at 299. 
 263. Id. 
 264. Id. at 300. 
 265. Id. at 301. 
 266. Id. 
 267. Strahl, 299 S.W.3d at 301. 
 268. Id. at 300–01. 
 269. Id. at 301. 
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“voluntarily” when personal illness is involved.270  That is, if a personal illness 
is the cause of the claimant’s unemployment and the claimant takes necessary 
and reasonable steps to preserve their employment, then they have not left 
work voluntarily.271  At this point in time, it is clear that Missouri courts have 
recognized the policy shift that Difatta-Wheaton represents and are applying its 
reasoning in a variety of cases.  This means that individuals like Ms. Davis,272 
Ms. Hernandez,273 Mr. Korkutovic,274 and Mr. Strahl275 are receiving 
unemployment benefits when they would not have under old rules and 
definitions.  Thus, Difatta-Wheaton represents a policy that expands access to 
unemployment insurance benefits in Missouri.  However, the Missouri Labor 
and Industrial Relations Commission has been reluctant to adopt Difatta-
Wheaton, stifling the expansion of benefits Difatta-Wheaton requires and 
creating an unemployment crisis in this state. 
IV.  MISSOURI’S UNEMPLOYMENT CRISIS 
A. The Labor and Industrial Relations Commission Ignores the Courts 
The Missouri Labor and Industrial Relations Commission is ignoring the 
Missouri Supreme Court.  The Commission, the bureaucratic agency charged 
with administering the unemployment insurance program in Missouri, has not 
recognized Difatta-Wheaton or the policy change Difatta-Wheaton represents.  
Rather, the Commission continues to apply the old standards regarding how 
personal illness affects the voluntary quit analysis276 found in cases like 
Duffy,277 Hessler,278 Wimberley,279 and Mena.280  To date, the Commission 
maintains that in order to receive unemployment benefits, an employee who 
has left work due to an illness must show that his job aggravated or caused the 
medical condition.281 
 
 270. See Difatta-Wheaton v. Dolphin Capital Corp., 271 S.W.3d 594, 598 (Mo. 2008) (en 
banc). 
 271. Id. at 598–99. 
 272. See supra notes 224–36 and accompanying text. 
 273. See supra notes 208–20 and accompanying text. 
 274. See supra notes 241–56 and accompanying text. 
 275. See supra notes 257–69 and accompanying text. 
 276. See, e.g., Davis v. Transp. Sec. & Div. of Emp’t Sec., 295 S.W.3d 594, 596–97 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 2009); Hernandez v. Staffing Solutions, Inc., 295 S.W.3d 564, 566–67 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009); 
Strahl v. Transp. Sec. Admin., 299 S.W.3d 298, 301 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007). 
 277. See supra notes 79–89 and accompanying text. 
 278. See supra notes 117–29, 141–46 and accompanying text. 
 279. See supra notes 90–103 and accompanying text. 
 280. See supra notes 147–62 and accompanying text. 
 281. See, e.g., Brown v. Div. of Emp’t Sec., 320 S.W.3d 748, 751 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010); 
Johnson v. Div. of Emp’t Sec., 318 S.W.3d 797, 802 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010); see also Selected Case 
Law Passages, supra note 18.  The Commission maintains that Difatta-Wheaton is a case dealing 
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Prior to January 2010 the Commission’s website, which is where claimants 
are directed to go when applying for benefits, stated: 
Work causing an aggravation of an existing condition, or work that was a 
contributing factor to the illness is also encompassed within the meaning of the 
clause “attributable to his work or to his employer,” the only requirement 
being that there exist a causal connection between the work and the 
aggravation of, or contribution to, the disability.282 
Further, the website used to contend that, where a medical condition is “not 
within common knowledge,” there “must be scientific or medical evidence” 
showing a causal connection between the illness and the employee’s job.283  
The Commission was still explicitly applying the standard as stated in Duffy,284 
which had been overturned by the Missouri Supreme Court two years 
earlier.285 
Although the Commission’s website has changed, the Commission itself is 
still blatantly ignoring the courts.  The Commission continues to apply the 
Duffy standard, even though Duffy’s language was specifically disaffirmed by 
the Missouri Supreme Court in Difatta-Wheaton.286  Also, the Southern 
District Court of Appeals in Strahl specifically stated that the Commission is 
making an “error of law” when it applies the old standard that requires 
claimants to demonstrate a causal connection between their work and their 
illness in order to receive benefits.287  Moreover, the Eastern District Court of 
Appeals in Davis and Hernandez has overturned Commission decisions 
because they have not followed the policy of Difatta-Wheaton.288  However, 
the Commission continues to ignore the courts and apply the voluntary quit 
 
with the court’s misconduct analysis, as they place it under the heading of “Misconduct Cases.”  
The Commission states that Difatta-Wheaton stands for the proposition that “When claimant was 
not able to return to work after approved leave, due to serious health issues, she was not 
disqualified from receiving benefits because she did not quit her employment ‘voluntarily.’  The 
claimant did everything possible to retain her job.”  Id. 
 282. Selected Case Law Passages, supra note 18 (quoting Bussmann Mfg. Co. v. Indus. 
Comm’n, 335 S.W.2d 456, 491 (Mo. Ct. App. 1960)). 
 283. Id. (quoting Clevenger v. Labor and Indus. Relations Comm’n, 600 S.W.2d 675, 676 
(Mo. Ct. App. 1980)). 
 284. Duffy v. Labor & Indus. Relations Comm’n, 556 S.W.2d 195, 198 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972) 
(citing La Plante v. Indus. Comm’n, 327 S.W.2d 487 491 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959); Bussmann Mfg. 
Co. v. Indus. Comm’n, 327 S.W.2d (Mo. Ct. App. 1959)) (“Personal illness of the employee 
unrelated to her employment will not render termination involuntary unless the illness was caused 
or aggravated by the work or the employer.”). 
 285. Difatta-Wheaton v. Dolphin Capital Corp., 271 S.W.3d 594, 598 n.7 (Mo. 2008) (en 
banc). 
 286. Id. 
 287. Strahl v. Transp. Sec. Admin., 299 S.W.3d 298, 301 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007). 
 288. Davis v. Transp. Sec. & Div. of Emp’t Sec., 295 S.W.3d 594, 596 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009); 
Hernandez v. Staffing Solutions, 295 S.W.3d 564, 567 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009). 
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analysis as found in Duffy and similar cases.289  Even after having several 
decisions overturned, the Commission is still wrongfully denying benefits.  
John J. Ammann, Director of the Saint Louis University Legal Clinic, has 
stated that his organization, which provides free legal services to indigent 
individuals, is still receiving new clients who have been wrongfully denied 
unemployment benefits by the Commission.290  So, it is clear that the 
Commission is continuing to misapply the law. 
The broader legal community, not just the courts, has recognized the 
change of law found in Difatta-Wheaton.  In fact, the aforementioned cases of 
Davis and Strahl, which held that Difatta-Wheaton was the applicable policy, 
were the two most important Missouri decisions regarding unemployment in 
the last half of 2009 according to Missouri Lawyers Weekly.291  However, the 
Labor and Industrial Relations Commission has continued to ignore the courts 
completely and the law.  The Commission continues to apply the reasoning and 
policy of Duffy, Hessler, Wimberley, and Mena.292  However, Difatta-Wheaton 
still represents an expansion of unemployment insurance in Missouri, as courts 
have been more than willing to overturn unlawful Commission decisions.  
Unfortunately, the Commission’s continued defiance of the courts and the law 
has created a crisis for many Missouri residents, who are already facing the 
crisis of unemployment. 
B. Missouri’s Unemployment Crisis 
The Labor and Industrial Relations Commission is continuing to ignore 
Difatta-Wheaton, and this is creating an unemployment crisis in Missouri.293  
The most obvious consequence of the Commission’s misapplication of the law 
 
 289. As recently as September 2010, the Commission argued that the Difatta-Wheaton 
holding was “limited to situations involving a life-threatening medical condition.”  Johnson v. 
Div. of Emp’t Sec., 318 S.W.3d 797, 802 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010); see also Brown v. Div. of Emp’t 
Sec., 320 S.W.3d 748, 751 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010) (“[T]he Commission’s conclusions . . . included 
no analysis of voluntariness of her resignation as required by Difatta-Wheaton.”). 
 290. Interview with John J. Ammann, supra note 70. 
 291. Major Opinions From the Second Half of 2009, MO. LAW. WKLY., Jan. 4, 2010, at 6, 
27–29. 
 292. See supra notes 286–90 and accompanying text; see, e.g., Respondent’s Brief at 20–24, 
Hernandez v. Staffing Solutions, 295 S.W.3d 564, 567 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009) (No. ED92154), 
wherein the Division of Employment Security articulates the “cause attributable to such work or 
to the claimant’s employer” standard, suggests that Difatta-Wheaton’s holding is limited to 
“medical emergenc[ies]” and cites Mena for authority. 
 293. See, e.g., Brown, 320 S.W.3d at 751 (Difatta-Wheaton was used to overturn the 
Commission’s determination that a domestic abuse victim’s resignation from her job was 
voluntary when she resigned to move to another state to get away from her abuser); Johnson, 318 
S.W.3d at 802 (Difatta-Wheaton was used to overturn the Commission’s determination that a 
single-mother whose car and child-care problems precipitated her dismissal for absenteeism was a 
“voluntary quit”). 
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is that individuals who should receive benefits when they initially apply are 
being wrongfully denied.294  However, the misapplication of law by the 
Commission is having a whole host of negative effects on unemployed 
Missouri residents seeking benefits. 
For those that do apply for benefits, the Commission’s misapplication of 
the law has a host of negative consequences.  As discussed previously, the 
Commission has a complex and lengthy appeals process.295  So, a 
misapplication of law by the Commission means that a claimant will be denied 
several times before he ever reaches the courts.296  For example, if the 
Commission applied the Duffy standard, instead of the correct Difatta-Wheaton 
standard, a claimant would have to appeal three times before the courts could 
overturn the Commission’s erroneous application of law.297  Thus, a denial at 
each level within the Commission has a host of negative consequence for the 
wrongfully denied employee. 
After the initial claim is filed, a wrongful denial by the Deputy means that, 
in the best case scenario, the claimant will have to wait up to an additional 
thirty days to receive benefits.298  This can be particularly difficult for an 
individual who is unemployed and suffering from a medical condition.  The 
Deputy’s wrongful denial also forces the claimant to fill out additional 
paperwork so that the matter can be appealed.299  Additionally, the claimant 
would need to collect evidence in preparation for the hearing before the 
Appeals Tribunal.300  The claimant would also want to become familiar with 
the rules and procedures applicable to a Tribunal hearing, all of which would 
take the claimant additional time.  In the worse case, a claimant who does not 
know the matter can be appealed, or who is not mentally or physically able to 
appeal, would not receive the benefits they are entitled to.  Also, it is likely that 
many claimants would simply accept the Deputy’s denial, reasoning that the 
Deputy would understand, and correctly apply, the laws of Missouri to their 
case.  These individuals would also not receive the benefits they are entitled to. 
If the matter is appealed, a wrongful denial by the Appeals Tribunal also 
has a host of negative consequences for the wrongfully denied claimant.  The 
wrongful denial means another thirty days the claimant will have to wait for 
benefits.301  Moreover, if the claimant does not realize they can appeal past the 
Tribunal, and fails to file for a review of the Tribunal’s decision within thirty 
 
 294. Interview with John J. Ammann, supra note 70. 
 295. See supra notes 19–68 and accompanying text (discussing the appeals process). 
 296. See supra notes 19–68 and accompanying text (discussing the appeals process). 
 297. See supra notes 19–68 and accompanying text (discussing the appeals process). 
 298. See MO. REV. STAT. § 288.070.6. (Supp. 2011). 
 299. Id. 
 300. See id. § 288.190.2. 
 301. See id. § 228.190.3. 
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days, the claimant loses all right to appeal further, thereby permanently losing 
benefits.302  A wrongful denial by the Tribunal also requires the claimant to file 
a motion for reconsideration or an application for review with the 
Commission.303  Also, depending on how the Commission wishes to proceed, 
the claimant may have to file a brief, argue his case before the Commission, or 
be prepared for additional hearings.304  These activities require a claimant to 
expend a lot of time, effort, and resources.  Once again, this can be difficult for 
someone who is having financial troubles, as a result of being unemployed, 
and who may be dealing with an illness.  Furthermore, if a claimant has been 
denied by the Deputy and by the Appeals Tribunal, he may simply give up and 
not appeal to the Commission even if he is aware of that right. 
A wrongful denial by the Commission means the claimant must file an 
appeal from the Commission’s decision with the Missouri Court of Appeals.305  
The claimant could proceed pro se in the court of appeals, but this would 
require the claimant to draft and file legal briefs, motions, and possibly argue 
the case in open court.306  Of course, this level of law practice is beyond the 
capabilities of most individuals who are not trained lawyers, as there are a 
plethora of rules that must be followed.307  So, the wrongfully denied claimant 
would likely have to pay for the services of a licensed attorney.  This presents 
complications to the claimant who has lost his employment.  John J. Ammann, 
Legal Clinic Director at Saint Louis University, stated “many of the 
wrongfully denied claimants cannot afford representation because they no 
longer have gainful employment, and have been denied their only benefits.”308  
Thus, many claimants would have no ready source of income to pay an 
attorney to take up their cause if he or she is still unemployed.  Moreover, on 
top of all of this, the claimant may still be dealing with an illness so severe that 
it caused him to leave his job.  Thus, a severely ill individual would have to 
shoulder the burden of paying hefty legal fees, mounting medical expenses, 
and all while being unemployed.  It is likely that a number of claimants who 
are wrongfully denied benefits by the Commission would simply give up and 
never get the benefits they deserve because of the costs and complications of 
continuing to fight. 
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 303. MO. REV. STAT. § 288.190.3 
 304. See MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 8, § 20-4.010 (Supp. 2011). 
 305. MO. REV. STAT. § 288.210 (2005). 
 306. See supra notes 61–70 and accompanying text. 
 307. Interview with John J. Ammann, supra note 70 (“For [pro se claimants] to handle their 
own appeal at the Commission level, write a brief that conforms to the rules, and handle their 
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transmission in my car.”). 
 308. Id. 
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A small number of claimants can seek out the aid of free legal services.  
For instance, attorney John J. Ammann and the law students at the Saint Louis 
University Legal Clinic have represented many clients in the appellate court 
who are appealing from wrongful denials of unemployment benefits by the 
Commission.309  For the few individuals who can find this type of help, 
successfully overturning the Commission’s erroneous decision is likely.  
However, these appeals can take months, if not years, leaving an already ill 
person without a source of income, and the money they deserve, for a lengthy 
period of time.  Additionally, these cases place a strain on institutions, like the 
Saint Louis University Legal Clinic, that provide free legal services to indigent 
individuals.  Appellate cases are time consuming, and clinics and free legal 
service providers are forced to take time and resources away from other worthy 
causes to help those that have been erroneously denied unemployment benefits.  
When asked about the toll that the unemployment appeals cases have on the 
clinic at Saint Louis University, John Ammann replied, “the unemployment 
appeals take up the biggest part of the clinic’s time and resources and 
precludes the clinic from representing other individuals in other matters.”310  
Specifically, Mr. Ammann stated “the clinic is no longer in a position to take 
on social security cases, and we are no longer able to take on the number of 
consumer protection cases we have in the past.”311  These problems would be 
substantially alleviated if the Commission would simply apply the correct legal 
standard initially. 
It is impossible to say with certainty how many individuals are not 
receiving the unemployment benefits that they deserve.  Based on the 
preceding discussion, it would not be surprising if the number is in the 
hundreds or even the thousands.  However, it would be a crisis if even one 
unemployed individual were denied the benefits he is entitled to when the 
Commission could easily remedy the problem.  It would be a crisis if 
individuals like Ms. Davis, Ms. Hernandez, and Mr. Strahl would have lost the 
benefits they deserve because the Commission refuses to listen to the Missouri 
Supreme Court.  Luckily, those three individuals were able to get 
representation and correct the injustice that had befallen them.  However, there 
are many individuals who are not so fortunate.  The Commission should end 
this crisis and follow the law. 
CONCLUSION 
The judiciary has played a large role in shaping Missouri’s unemployment 
policies.  The Missouri Supreme Court in Difatta-Wheaton fundamentally 
 
 309. See, e.g., Davis v. Transp. Sec. & Div. of Emp’t Sec., 295 S.W.3d 594 (Mo. Ct. App. 
2009) (noting that John J. Ammann of St. Louis, Mo., represented the claimant). 
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changed the availability of unemployment benefits to individuals who were 
forced to leave their job because of a personal illness.  The Missouri Supreme 
Court expanded access to unemployment insurance to those individuals by no 
longer requiring that an illness or medical condition be related to their job for 
benefits to be available.  So, under the new Difatta-Wheaton policy, an 
employee who becomes ill and cannot work is entitled to benefits.312  
However, for reasons unknown, the Missouri Labor and Industrial Relations 
Commission is not following the precedent set in Difatta-Wheaton and is 
denying benefits to individuals who are entitled to them. 
The Commission is continuing not to apply Difatta-Wheaton even though 
it is having decisions overturned by the courts for failure to do so.313  The 
Commission is persisting in applying old standards found in cases that have 
been explicitly disaffirmed by the Missouri Supreme Court.  This is causing 
the Commission, at all levels, to deny claimants wrongfully who left work 
because of a personal illness.  These wrongful denials are placing an extreme 
burden on claimants who are forced into a complex and confusing appeals 
process within the Commission and in the courts.  Moreover, the 
Commission’s misapplication of law is creating a crisis for many unemployed 
Missouri residents who, for a plethora of reasons, cannot seek assistance from 
the courts in overturning the Commission’s unlawful decisions.  In reality, the 
Commission’s misapplication of law is resulting in individuals who deserve 
benefits not receiving them, or receiving them months or years after they 
should.  While the exact number of individuals being wronged by the 
Commission’s failure to recognize Difatta-Wheaton is not yet known, if even 
one person is denied the benefits they deserve it would constitute a crisis, 
especially considering that the Commission could fix the problem by simply 
correctly applying the law.  It is important to understand that this comment 
does not ask the Commission to change its structure fundamentally, invest 
resources into some vast new venture, or make personnel changes.  This 
Comment simply asks that the Commission apply the law correctly and stop 
the injustices occurring to many unemployed Missouri residents.  The 
Commission could, and should, end this crisis now. 
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